Part 5: The State Returns
The chip shortage of 2021 changed how governments see the industry. Car plants stopped for lack of parts that cost a few dollars, chips became a question of national security, and states returned to the industry with large budgets.
November 13, 2026
Part 5 · 2020–2024 · The State Returns
The chip shortage of 2021 changed how governments see the industry. Car plants stopped for lack of parts that cost a few dollars, chips became a question of national security, and states returned to the industry with large budgets.
The United States passed the CHIPS and Science Act in 2022, with about $53 billion for manufacturing and research. Europe followed with its own Chips Act. Japan backed Rapidus to build advanced chips in Hokkaido and also supported the TSMC plant in Kumamoto, while Korea, China, Malaysia and others announced programmes of their own.
The scale is larger than most of us realise. The Global Semiconductor Industrial Policy Tracker from the University of Michigan counts close to $490 billion in commitments across 12 jurisdictions. Only about 30 percent of that is traced to named recipients so far, and of the money that is traced, roughly three quarters goes to chip factories.
The recipients are mostly established companies such as Intel, TSMC, Samsung, Micron, Infineon and Bosch, and startups received very little. Several of the subsidised companies are also regular buyers of startups. We should read this clearly, because public money is strengthening the companies most likely to acquire new ventures.
This changes the strategy for a young chip company. Winning a share of the subsidy directly is hard, while selling into the projects that the subsidy funds is much easier. Every new factory needs equipment, materials, test, software, security and trained people, and those needs are where smaller firms like ours can earn.
Export controls are now part of the same picture. The United States restricts advanced chips and tools for China, and China has proposed controls of its own on chip design and packaging technology. Any company working across these borders must manage compliance from the first day.
For Bangladesh this era has two lessons. First, we should not compete for leading-edge factories, because larger economies are spending far more than we can. Second, we can supply the programmes that others are funding, since engineering services, test and packaging, and compliance-ready design work all have buyers in these markets. A clear export-control regime will also make our country a more trusted partner.